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With the advance of E-Commerce over Web-based 
information, the interoperability of isolated XML 
repositories and databases over the Internet has drawn 
an increasing interest recently. Little effort, however, has 
been made to preserve necessary autonomy and security 
of each individual XML repository or database during 
information exchange or evolution. Generic model 
management has been intensively researched and also 
implemented in a prototype since its first introduction. 
Security related research is yet to be conducted for model 
management. This paper presents a uniform security 
model for access control specifications of heterogeneous 
data models over the Web. Based on the uniform 
representation, we present security extensions to our 
previous work on visual model management operators for 
managing access control specifications to allow 
heterogeneous Web data models to exchange information 




Web-based information interchange is particularly 
important in electronic commerce (EC) applications, 
where basic transactions such as vendor registrations, 
bidding submissions, requests for quotes, and contracts 
are increasingly realized by exchanging appropriate 
digital documents [10]. The huge success of the Web as a 
platform for EC and information dissemination has 
brought an increasing awareness of the fact that document 
exchange over the Internet should meet security 
requirements such as fine-grained authenticity, and access 
control, involving data units at the level of granularity 
stipulated by the communicating parties. According to 
Samarati et al [26], authorizations are specified on 
portions of a HTML document, yet no semantic context 
similar to that provided by XML [5] can be supported. 
While HTML has its inherent limitations, XML has great 
potential to provide fine-grained security features. XML 
access control has been a hot research topic since the first 
set of access control specifications was proposed [7]. 
Recently, the continuing demand for information sharing 
has shifted interest from stand-alone XML repositories to 
inter-connected and large-scale cooperative XML systems 
[9]. As more and more Web information sharing occurs 
on the Internet, security of information exchange with a 
single Web site and among different Web sites has to be 
addressed. 
Even though every individual data model may have 
highly secure access control specifications and 
enforcement mechanism, the federation of data models is 
not necessarily secure. Security of a union of systems 
depends on the weakest link. When information of 
different models is interchanging, it opens a window for 
attack. It is necessary to securely manipulate multiple 
models. Most previous work however concentrated on the 
access control of individual data models or management 
of models without security concern. Model management 
is a new approach to metadata management that offers a 
high-level programming interface [1] and avoids object-
at-a-time primitives. It reduces the amount of 
programming needed for metadata intensive applications 
by manipulating models with generic operators. Our 
previous work provides a visual model management 
architecture to ease the use of model management 
systems [29].  
This paper focuses on the security properties of 
model management, and explores various issues and 
solutions to achieve secure model management for Web 
data models. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 introduces the model management 
concept. Section 3 overviews two security models over 
the Web. Section 4 presents an abstract security model 
and proposes security extensions to model management 
operators. Section 5 compares related work, and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Model Management 
 
Model management environment offers operators 
that generalize the transformation operations for various 
metadata applications. The main model management 
operators include Match, Compose, Diff, ModelGen, 
Merge and so on [2]. 
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Consider a typical example of building a database 
federation. Suppose we are given a mapping map1 from a 
database S1 to another database S2, and wish to build a 
federation of the two databases, where S2 is similar to S1 
(Figure 1). First we call Match (S1, S2) to obtain a 
mapping map2 between S1 and S2, which shows where S2 
is the same as S1. Second, we call Merge (map1, S1, S2) to 
obtain a mapping map3 between S2 and SW and a mapping 
between S1 and SW. Comparing to programming the 
whole system for individual requirements, using model 
management reduces considerable programming effort by 
composing generic operators. 
 
3. Current Access Control Models 
 
Recently many security models for various data 
models have been proposed. We survey existing access 
control models and classify security models related to 
Web data security into two categories as XML related 
models and database related models. 
• XML Access Control Models 
Authorization-based XML access control models 
consist of a set of authorization rules. Each rule consists 
of subject, object, action, access and some other 
extensions. Damiani’s approach associates a specific 
authorization sheet with each XML document/DTD 
expressing the authorizations on the document [7, 8, 10] 
An access control environment for XML documents and 
techniques to deal with authorization priorities and 
conflict resolution issues are proposed by Bertino and 
Ferrari [4]. Although our uniform security model is based 
on existing XML authorization models, we focus on how 
to use the uniform representation to provide security 
extension for Web data model management, and none of 
the above XML authorization models addresses the 
interaction between different access control models. 
• Database Access Control Models 
Database access control models can be further 
classified into two categories: multilevel security models 
[14, 28] and discretionary security models. Multilevel 
security models are seldom used in commercial 
applications due to their restrictive nature. A 
discretionary security model allows the creator of a data 
object x to own all the privileges associated with x and to 
grant some of the privileges to other users so that various 
access control policies could be enforced. Discretionary 
security models are dominant in commercial data 
management. Most database systems implement 
discretionary access control models similar to the one 
implemented in System R [13]. Role-based access control 
[27] is not implemented in System R but implemented by 
most existing DBMSs such as Oracle. Similar approaches 
in the context of object-oriented databases have also been 
presented [12, 24]. 
 
4. Security Extension to Model Management 
 
4.1 Uniform Abstract Access Control Model 
 
To manage access control specifications for 
heterogeneous data models, an abstract access control 
model is desirable. The development of an access control 
system requires the definition of subjects and objects 
against which authorization must be specified and access 
control must be enforced [10]. We define a uniform 
abstract access control model, which consists of a set of 
rules, each being a tuple of five elements: subject, object, 
action, authorization, and propagation. Access control 
regulates access to the data, such as HTML documents, 
XML documents, and databases called objects. Those 
who try to access these objects are called subjects.  
Usually subjects can be referred to on the basis of 
their identities or locations from which requests originate. 
We provide an abstract representation for each subject by 
a unique user-defined identifier, such as teacher, 
administrator. A set Obj of uniform identifies (URI) [3] 
denotes the resources to be protected, i.e. objects. For 
XML documents, URI is extended with XPath [31], for 
identifying the elements and attributes within a document. 
In database area, the granularity of identifiers is down to 
table or at most column. To uniformly identify various 
models over the Internet, we propose a novel identifier 
UPath. Similar to XPath, UPath identifies objects of data 
models by path, e.g. tables and columns of a relational 
schema, elements and attributes of an XML schema. We 
borrow some ideas from relational calculus to represent 
objects in a relational database by UPath. For example, an 
E-business company none.com has a database D, which 
includes table sample. Then the UPath of the column 
 2. map2 S1 SW 
S2 
 
Given: S1, S2 
1. map1 = M atch(S1,S2) 
2. (Sw,map2, map3)  = 
Merge (map1,S1, S2) 
1. map1 2. map3 
Figure 1. Using model management to help 

















Figure 2. Course schemas for two schools 







Authorized licensed use limited to: Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Downloaded on March 8, 2009 at 23:07 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
stock_no of sample will be /D/sample/stock_no. In 
the access control model, we propose the URI + UPath as 
the object path expression that will be illustrated by an 
example in the next section. Subjects can take a set of 
actions, including read, write, update, and delete. 
Authorization specifies the negative or positive response 
to requests, i.e. grant or deny. Our model specifies the 
propagation as local or recursive, referring to the 
influence to the object locally or recursively to its 
corresponding child objects.  
Figure 3 shows a visual representation of access 
control rules, represented by an access graph. Each rule is 
a link from a subject to an object. A subject is represented 
by a labeled rectangle connecting to objects that are 
represented by labeled eclipses. A gray eclipse represents 
recursive access, and a white eclipse indicates local 
access. The label of each link, R or W in the example, 
represents the activity. A circle and a cross on the link 
represent grant and deny of access respectively.  
 
4.2 An Illustrative Example 
 
Two schools offer two 
types of courses, i.e. 
traditional classroom 
courses and distance 
learning courses, for 
students to register online. 
Assume the two schools 
wish to provide a uniform online course registration 
system, and have to deal with the data defined in two 
schemas. Figure 2 shows the two schemas, A for 
classroom courses and B for distance learning courses. 
Both are XML Schemas.  
Each school has a set of local access control rules as 
shown in Tables 1 and 2. In Table 1, Rules 1 and 2 
restrict public access only to Name and Teacher of a 
Course. A student can read everything about a Course, 
while a teacher can change Notes of a Course.  
Management of individual authorization rules has 
been intensively investigated. If a user tries to access the 
course information, the user will be first authenticated 
and then the access control enforcement mechanism will 
query and prune the information according to the access 
control rules (ACRs). Enforcement mechanisms of XML 
access control are surveyed by Luo et al [18]. 
If the two schools want 
to exchange credits and 
create unified courses, a 
straightforward approach is 
to create a unified model and 
migrate existing data to 
conforming to the new 
model.  
A model management 
system eases the process by 
generic operators like Match 
and Merge. Figure 4 shows the scenario of unifying the 
two models by the two operators. ACRA and ACRB are 
access control rules for MA and MB respectively. Mu is the 
unified model of models MA and MB. ACRu is a set of 
access control rules for model Mu. The model 
management system matches and merges MA and MB to 
generate Mu, but is not able to automatically generate 
ACRu. Users have to construct ACRu manually from the 
scratch. It is error-prone, time-consuming, and highly 
risky to manually manipulate access control rules in a 
large scale such as an EC Web site. To ease the process, a 
security extension for model management operators, like 
Match, to automatically manage access control rules is 
desirable.  
4.3 Schema Matching with Security Property 
 
Regarding the security of data models, the Match 
operator only matches objects, called object matching. 
For the example in Figure 2, the Match operator takes 
models A and B as input, and produces mapping Map1_2 
but not a mapping of access control rules. In addition to 
Table 2. Access Rules for Model B 
 Subject Object Action Authorization Propagation 
1 Everyone /Course/C_Name Read Grant L 
2 Everyone /Course/Teacher Read Grant R 
3 Student /Course/ Read Grant R 
4 Lecturer /Course/ Read Grant R 
5 Lecturer /Course/URL Write Grant L 
6 Lecturer /Course/Notes Write Grant L 
Table 1. Access Rules for Model A 
 Subject Object Action Authorization Propagation 
1 Public /Course/Name Read Grant L 
2 Public /Course/Teacher Read Grant L 
3 Student /Course/ Read Grant R 
4 Teacher /Course/ Read Grant R 
5 Teacher /Course/Notes Write Grant L 
Figure 3.Visual representation 










Figure 4. Unified course 
registration online system 
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the object matching, the match operator is extended to 
match the subjects of two access control rules, called 
subject matching. If two subjects have similar or the same 
accesses, they are mapped as the same subject. For 
example, “Public” in Table 1 is the same as “Everyone” 
in Table 2, so they are regarded as one subject in the 
unified model. 
Match with a security extension takes two input 
models, each having a set of access control rules attached. 
The extended Match operator is defined as follows: 
Definition 1: (Mapm, Mapa) = Match ((M1, ACR1), 
(M2, ACR2)), where M1 and M2 are two data models, 
ACR1 and ACR2 are access control rules of M1 and M2 
respectively. □ 
The result (Mapm, Mapa) contains two mappings, 
Mapm between objects of input models and Mapa between 
the subjects of two sets of access 
control rules. Figure 5 shows the 
result of subject mapping for 
access control rules, where Public 
of ACR1 is equal to Everyone of 
ACR2, and Teacher of ACR1 
plays the same role of Lecturer of 
ACR2. 
The Match operator can be realized by a schema-
matching algorithm, which has been investigated for 
several years. Many techniques [25], such as graph 
isomorphism, natural language processing, machine 
learning, and data mining, have been proposed. The 
algorithm for subject matching can be implemented in a 
similar way. For example, linguistically Public is similar 
to Everyone, and some matching algorithms would 
create a mapping between the two subjects as shown in 
Figure 5.  
Existing matching algorithms, however, do not 
consider security properties of access control rules, and 
produce poor and sometimes risky mappings. For 
example, assume that the example in Section 4.2 has one 
subject for each model, Admin for model A, and 
Administrator for model B. While Admin is a Web site 
administrator and has full access to everything, 







thus introduce a 
possible violation 
of access rules of ACR2, e.g. an Admin user can write 
notes of a course in model B. A security extension of 
match should produce a safe subject mapping defined as 
follows. 
Models M1 and M2 have access control rules ACR1 
and ACR2 respectively. S1 and S2 are subjects of ACR1 
and ACR2. Map1_2 is the object mapping between M1 and 
M2. Maps is a subject mapping between S1 and S2. 
Definition 2: Maps is safe if and only if 
      ∀  (s1, s2) ∈Maps  ∀  (o1, o2) ∈Map1_2 ∀  a 
(grant (s1, o1, a) ?? grant (s2, o2, a)), where s1 and s2 are 
subjects of S1 and S2, o1 and o2 are objects of M1 and M2, 
a is an action, grant (s1, o1, a) means that the s1 is granted 
to perform action a on o1. □ 
To produce safe subject mappings, we propose an 
approach called security isomorphism, which calculates 
the similarity of subjects from not only linguistics but 
also semantics of access control rules, and generates 
subject mapping based on the isomorphism of ACRs. The 
algorithm matches subject’s access rules to calculate the 
similarity of two subjects. Similarity of two subjects 
consists of LS (linguistic similarity) and SS (semantics 
similarity). If s is a subject of access rules, we represent 
G (s) as a set of objects that S has access and D (s) as the 
set of objects that S was prohibited to access. 
Definition 3: Overlap set between two subjects: O 
(s1, s2) = {(o1, o2)| o1∈G (s1) and o2 ∈ G (s2), and s1 and 
s2 are two subjects, and (o1, o2) is a mapping}.□ 
As shown in Figure 6 the overlap set between 
Teacher and Lecturer is the mapping (1, a). 
Definition 4: Semantic similarity between two 
subject nodes: SS(s1, s2) = |O (s1, s2)|/ N, where N = 
|G(s1)| + |G(s2)| - |O (s1, s2)|, and mapping (o, p) does not  
exist such that o∈G(s1) and p∈D(s2) or o∈G(s2) and 
p∈D(s1) . Otherwise, SS(s1, s2) = -1. □ 
We present the following algorithm to compute the 
similarity of two subjects, and then match subjects by 
using an algorithm like stable marriage [17]. 
1.     Produce linguistics similarity LS(s1, s2); 
2.     SS(s1,s2) = 0; 
3.     For each pair of subjects 
4.             For each rule in ACR 
5.                  If grant(s1, o, a) and grant(s2, o, a) then 
6.                          O(s1, s2) ?o  
7.                  Else if violation exists then 
8.                          SS(s1, s2)=-1; break; 
9.                  End if 
10.          If (SS(s1,s2) != -1 
11.               SS(s1, s2) = | O(s1, s2)|/ N; 
 
12.   If SS(s1, s2) >=0 then 
13.           SIM(s1, s2) = w* LS(s1, s2) + (1-w) * SS(s1, s2); 
14.   Else  
15.  SIM(s1, s2) = -1; 
16.   For each subject s1 in S1 
17. If Max ( SIM(s1, s2)) and SIM(s1,s2) >0 then 
18.                Maps ? (s1, s2); 






Figure 5. The Mapa example 
 
R RR R 
Teacher Lecturer
a b 21
Figure 6. Graphical representation of 
access control rules 
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Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 generates safe mappings. 
Proof: The algorithm computes the similarity 
between any pair of subjects in two input models based 
on the object mapping. Any possible violation will be 
identified in lines 7-8 by marking the semantic similarity 
as -1. Through line 10-12, the SS value will finally 
prevent mapping between any two violating subjects in 
line 17. 
Therefore the algorithm generates the mapping 
between those pairs of subjects that have no possible 
violation of access control rules. According to Definition 
2, the generated mapping is a safe mapping.□ 
Though we concentrate on discretionary subjects 
matching, the solution presented here can also be used for 
matching subjects of multi-level security models. 
 
4.4 Other Operators with Security Property  
 
The security extension of Merge eases the process 
by automatically generating access control rules for the 
merged data model. We define the Merge operator with 
security extension as following: 
 Definition 5: (M3, ACR3, Map1_3, Map2_3) = Merge 
(M1, M2, Map1_2, ACR1, ACR2, Mapa), where M1 and M2 
are input data models, and Map1_2 represents the mapping 
between M1 and M2. Mapa represents the mapping 
between two access control rules ACR1 and ACR2. □ 
A Merge operator 
generates M3, Map1_3, and 
Map2_3. The result model M3 
for the previous example is 
shown in Figure 7. Mapped 
elements in M1 and M2 are 
collapsed into one element in 
the new model, such as Name 
and C_Name into Name. 
 Other than object merge, 
the security extension of the 
Merge operator also merges 
access control rules into a set of 
result access control rules, i.e. ACR3. The process of 
merging two access control rules is called access merge. 
Access merge is based on subject mappings. As 
shown in Figure 5, Mapa denotes the relationship between 
all possible subjects of two input access control rules. The 
two mapped subjects should be collapsed into one subject, 
such as Teacher and Lecturer into Teacher, and share 
the same access authorization. 
Other operators also need to extend with security 
properties, such as ModelGen. After the ModelGen 
operation, some objects of the original model may be 
removed, and the security extension of the ModelGen 
operator needs to adjust the access control rules for the 
generated model. We will extend other visual model 
management operators with security properties in our 
future work. 
 
5. Related Work 
 
Many proposals on access control mechanisms have 
been presented in both database literature [13, 27, 15, 16, 
14, 28] and XML area [10, 7, 4]. There are, however, few 
proposals on access controls across heterogeneous data 
models, and the most related work are the work on secure 
XML federations [32] and XML security models using 
relational databases [18]. Tan also proposed an idea of 
using RDBMS to handle access controls for XML 
documents, in a rather limited setting [30]. Farkas et al 
developed algorithms to automate the access control rules 
transformation process, while preserving the Access 
Control requirements of the original systems [11]. They 
studied and developed methods to automatically translate 
Access Control Lists and Bell-LaPadula models to ASL. 
They concentrated only on the access control rules while 
we manipulate the related schemas at the same time.  
On the other hand, various systems for model 
management have been presented. Cupid [19, 20] and 
SFA [21] match objects. Buneman et al described a 
theoretical foundation of merge [6]. Pottinger et al 
presented the Merge operator based on the BDK 
algorithm [23]. Most of the approaches only concentrate 
on part of model management without any discussion on 
security issues. Rondo [22] is the first complete prototype 
of the generic model management system. None of these 





This paper has proposed the first security extension 
to model management operators. We provided uniform 
abstract access control rules for heterogeneous data 
Table 3. Access Control Rules for Merged Model 
 Subject Object Action Authorization Propagation 
1 Public /Course/Name Read Grant L 
2 Public /Course/Teacher Read Grant L 
3 Student /Course/ Read Grant R 
4 Teacher /Course/ Read Grant R 
5 Teacher /Course/URL Write Grant L 











Figure 7. Result merged schema 
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models and a visual representation of the access control 
model. Having presented approaches for automatic 
generation of subject matching and proved that the 
security isomorphism algorithm generates safe mappings, 
the paper also discussed the security issues involved in 
other operators. The security extensions to our previous 
work on visual model management operators provides 
automatic generation mechanism for managing access 
control specifications to allow heterogeneous Web data 
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